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COMMENT
SHU-HAO ZHAO V. SCHILTGEN:*
PERSECUTION ON ACCOUNT OF
POLITICAL OPINION-INCONSISTENCIES
AND AMBIGUITIES
I. INTRODUCTION
In response to the rapid growth in population in the
People's Republic of China (PRC or China), the Chinese gov-
ernment introduced the "one couple, one child" policy in 1979.
It is this policy upon which petitioner Shu-Hao Zhao (Zhao or
petitioner), and many other Chinese immigrants base their
asylum claims.' In the hopes of quelling an increasing popula-
tion control problem, Chinese authorities introduced a family
planning policy that consists mainly of education, propaganda,
and economic incentives.2 In addition, the PRC's policy man-
dates that couples limit their families to one child, or face
sanctions such as fines, forced abortions, compulsory steriliza-
tions, implantation of intrauterine devices, and inevitably,
ridicule, ostracism, and stigmatization.3 Since China imple-
* No. C 93-3660 CW, 1995 WL 165562 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1995).
1. See Stanford M. Lin, Recent Development, China's One-Couple, One-Child
Family Planning Policy as Grounds for Granting Asylum-Xin-Chang Zhang v.
Slattery, No. 94 Ciu. 2119 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 5, 1994), 36 HARV. INTL L.J. 231, 234
(1995); see also Zhao, 1995 WL 165562, at *1.
2. See U.S. DEPlT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS AND TRADE, REFUGEE DETERMINATION:
CHINA 35-36 (Country Profile Series Nov. 1993); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY
REPORTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS PRACTICES FOR- 1993: REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE
COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS OF THE U.S. SENATE AND THE COMM. ON FOREIGN
AFFAIRS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, CHINA SECTION 609 (Feb. 1993).
3. See Lin, supra note 1, at 235; Tara A. Moriarty, Comment, Guo v. Carroll:
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mented this policy, it has taken subsequent steps to insure its
compliance, and its birth and fertility rates have dropped dra-
matically.4 Consequently, the number of China's fleeing citi-
zens seeking asylum in the United States has increased steadi-
ly.
In June 1993, Mr. Zhao, a citizen of the PRC, became one
of many people who sought asylum in the United States be-
cause of his or her country's family planning policy.5 In 1995,
the United States District Court for the Northern District of
California decided Shu-Hao Zhao v. Schiltgen, holding that Mr.
Zhao was not eligible for either political asylum or withhold-
ing of deportation' under the Immigration and Nationality Act
(INA)."
This Comment will discuss the history of Shu-Hao Zhao v.
Schiltgen and the decision of the Zhao court. It addresses the
Political Opinion, Persecution, and Coercive Population Control in the People's Re-
public of China, 8 GEO. IMIMGR. L.J. 469, 482 (1994).
4. See Lin, supra note 1, at 235 (citing Lena H. Sun, China's Crackdown on
Births: A Stunning, and Harsh, Success, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 25, 1993, at 1).
5. See Zhao, 1995 WL 165562, at *1-2.
6. See Immigration and Nationality Act [INA] § 208(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a)
(1994).
7. See id. § 243(h), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h).
8. See Zhao, 1995 WL 165562 at *1. There are two methods by which a de-
portable alien present in the United States may seek relief: asylum and withhold-
ing of deportation. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 423 (1987). Al-
though the granting of asylum and the withholding of deportation are closely re-
lated, see Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1021 (2d Cir. 1994), there are two impor-
tant distinctions. "First, '[tihe burden of proof that an alien must meet to be eligi-
ble for asylum is lower than that required of an alien who seeks withholding of
deportation." Id. (quoting Carranza-Hernandez v. INS, 12 F.3d 4, 7 (2d Cir. 1993))
(alteration in original). "Second, once eligibility for asylum has been established, a
grant of asylum remains within the Attorney General's discretion. In contrast,
'withholding of deportation for those who qualify [is] mandatory rather than discre-
tionary.'" Id. (quoting Aliens and Nationality; Asylum and Withholding of Deporta-
tion Procedures, 55 Fed. Reg. 30,674, 30,675 (1990)) (alteration in original). Since
Osorio, this language regarding the mandatory nature of witholding of deportation
has been codified in the Code of Federal Regulations. 8 C.F.R. § 208.16(c)(1)
(1996). "Thus, although the Attorney General has the discretion to deny asylum to
an alien eligible under section 208(a), she may not deny withholding of deportation
to the same alien if the alien satisfies the stricter standards of section 243(h)."
Osorio, 18 F.3d at 1021 (citing Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. at 443 & n.28). Section
243(h) states in pertinent part: "The Attorney General shall not deport or return
any alien.., to a country if the Attorney General determines that such an
alien's life or freedom would be threatened in such a country on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political opinion."
INA § 243(h)(1), 8 U.S.C. § 1253(h)(1).
[Vol. XXII:310
SHU-HAO ZHAO V. SCHILTGEN
current state of China's population control policy, and its policy
of sterilizing men and women who act contrary to its "one
couple, one child" law. This Comment argues that Zhao was
incorrectly decided by the district court, and that past judicial
interpretations of the asylum laws have been erroneous and
inconsistent. This Comment further asserts that petitioner's
claim for asylum should have been granted despite the district
court's interpretation of current asylum laws; and that peti-
tioner should have been granted asylum based on United
States jurisprudential notions of persecution and basic human
rights.
Finally, this Comment concludes that even if the United
States chooses not to define its current asylum laws as to in-
clude fear of compulsory sterilization and abortion (as well as
other coercive procedures) as legitimate means for granting
asylum, the U.S. Congress should broaden the Refugee Act of
1980 (Refugee Act)' to make such fears a sixth ground of per-
secution."0
II. REGULATORY AND JUDICIAL HISTORY OF U.S. ASYLUM LAW
A. Statutory Guidelines-The Immigration and Nationality Act
and the Refugee Act
Applications for asylum in the United States are governed
by the INA," as amended by the Refugee Act. 2 In 1980,
9. Pub. L. No. 96-212, 94 Stat. 102 (codified as amended in scattered sec-
tions of 8 & 22 U.S.C.).
10. The Refugee Act, in defining "refugee," sets forth five grounds for persecu-
tion:
The term "refugee" means (A) any person who is outside any country of
such person's nationality or, in the case of a person having no nationali-
ty, is outside any country in which such person last habitually resided,
and who is unable or unwilling to return to, and is unable or unwilling
to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country because of
persecution or a well-founded fear of persecution on account of race, reli-
gion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion ....
8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(42)(A). Similarly, federal regulations set forth these five grounds
for persecution in establishing eligibility for withholding of deportation:
The applicant's life or freedom shall be found to be threatened if it is
more likely than not that he would be persecuted on account of race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group, or political
opinion.
8 C.F.R. § 208.16(b)(1) (1996).
11. Ch. 477, 66 Stat. 163 (1952) (codified as amended at 8 U.S.C. §§ 1101-
1997]
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Congress passed the Refugee Act to establish "formal statutory
procedures concerning asylum applications for the first time in
U.S. immigration law.... ,,'s Its purpose was to enable refu-
gees to seek a safe haven on American soil. The Refugee Act
was to serve as an "instrument that would allow this country
to carry out the humanitarian ideal to which our nation has
been historically committed. That ideal is the offer of liberty
and safety to persons from other lands who are persecuted." 4
Although the United States seeks to provide individuals
fleeing oppression with a safe haven by "welcoming homeless
refugees to [its] shores," 5 according to the guidelines estab-
lished pursuant to the INA, the definition of "refugee" lies at
the focal point of U.S. asylum law. Under section 208 of the
INA, an individual may qualify for asylum in the United
States if he or she meets the definition of "refugee."'6 In order
to qualify for asylum as a refugee, an alien must meet the
burden of proving an objective "well-founded" basis for his or
her subjective fear of persecution on account of either race,
religion, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion.' In other words, an applicant's burden of
proving "well-founded fear" necessitates a showing of objective
elements, such as conditions in the alien's home country, as
well as subjective elements, such as the alien's mental state.'8
1524).
12. 94 Stat. 102; see Daniel Compton, Comment, Asylum for Persecuted Social
Groups: A Closed Door Left Slightly Ajar-Sanchez-Trujillo v. INS, 801 F.2d 1571
(9th Cir. 1986), 62 WASH. L. REV. 913, 914 (1987).
13. James M. Moschella, Comment, Osorio v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service: The Second Circuit and "Well-Founded Fear of Persecution on Account of
Political Opinion," 21 BROOM J. INTL L. 471, 475 (1995). The Refugee Act states:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically
present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irre-
spective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be
granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney
General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of
section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (emphasis added).
14. Doris Meissner, Reflections on the Refugee Act of 1980, in THE NEW ASY-
LUM SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980S 57, 58-59 (David A. Martin ed., 1988).
15. S. REP. No. 96-256, at 1 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 141.
16. See 8 U.S.C. § 1158(a).
17. See INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 430 (1987).
18. See Moschella, supra note 13, at 480; Arthur C. Helton, The Criteria For
Refugee Protection and Asylum in the United States, in BASIC IMMIGRATION LAW
1992, at 205, 211-12 (PLI Litig. & Admin. Practice Course Handbook Series No.
312 [Vol. XXIII:1
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Specifically, section 101(a)(42)(A) of the Refugee Act' 9
mandates that "[a]n alien may be classified as a refugee within
the meaning of the INA if he or she is unable or unwilling to
return to the country of origin because of persecution or a well-
founded fear of persecution on account of race, nationality,
membership in a particular social group, or political opin-
ion."" Therefore, an individual physically present in the Unit-
ed States may seek asylum in this country if he or she proves
to be a victim of persecution or has a well-founded fear of be-
ing persecuted upon return to his or her country.2'
Although the United States has been committed to grant-
ing asylum to those who meet its definition of "refugee," it has
not granted asylum to "people who are not [individual] targets
of persecution but suffer instead from general conditions in
their own countries."22 This distinction has inspired much de-
bate over the ability of aliens to seek political asylum based on
opposition to their country's population control policies. Deny-
ing an individual asylum who has been persecuted similarly to
others in his or her country has been met with both ardent
support and unyielding opposition. These divergent views are
illustrated by the inconsistent interpretations handed down by
numerous administrative and judicial bodies regarding immi-
grants seeking asylum as refugees in the United States on
account of their opposition to such policies."
B. International Standards
Because Congress passed the Refugee Act in order to con-
form to international refugee standards,24 any analysis of U.S.
asylum law must include a discussion of the 1967 United Na-
tions Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees (U.N. Proto-
col),' which the United States has ratified,26 and is the foun-
433, 1992).
19. 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A).
20. Shu-Hao Zhao v. Schiltgen, No. C 93-3660 CW, 1995 WL 165562 at *4
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1995) (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42)(A)).
21. See Laura J. Dietrich, United States Asylum Policy, in THE NEW ASYLUM
SEEKERS: REFUGEE LAW IN THE 1980S, supra note 14, at 67-68.
22. Id. at 67.
23. See infra notes 42-62 and accompanying text.
24. See Compton, supra note 12, at 914.
25. Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees, Jan. 31, 1967, 19 U.S.T. 6223,
606 U.N.T.S. 267 [hereinafter U.N. Protocol].
26. Congress ratified the U.N. Protocol in 1968. See 114 CONG. REC. 29,607
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dation for the Refugee Act. The Protocol revised the United
Nations Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951
(U.N. Convention),27 and helped to clarify the meaning of "ref-
ugee" and explain the principle of nonrefoulement.
At the heart of international refugee law is the universal
definition of "refugee" and the core principle of
nonrefoulement.' The U.N. Convention defines "refugee" as
any person who,
owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons
of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular so-
cial group or political opinion, is outside the country of his
nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling
to avail himself of the protection of that country; or who, not
having a nationality and being outside the country of his
former habitual residence as a result of such events, is un-
able or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to return to it.29
The Refugee Act of 1980 adopts this amended definition of
refugee.3"
In addition, the Office of the United Nations High Com-
missioner for Refugees drafted a handbook for determining
refugee status (U.N. Handbook),31 which serves as the prin-
ciple guide to interpreting the term "refugee," and specifies
how to apply the U.N. Protocol's definition." For example, the
U.N. Handbook acknowledges that where an asylum applicant
must demonstrate that he or she qualifies as a refugee, the
applicant is not required to illustrate the precise motives of his
or her persecutors.3 Furthermore, the U.N. Handbook recog-
(1968). By virtue of ratification, the provisions of the U.N. Protocol have become a
part of U.S. law under the Supremacy Clause. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2;
Moschella, supra note 13, at 474.
27. Convention Relating to the Status of Refugees, July 28, 1951, 19 U.S.T.
6259, 189 U.N.T.S. 137 [hereinafter U.N. Convention].
28. See Compton, supra note 12, at 915-16 (discussing the principle of
nonrefoulement). See generally GUNNEL STENBERG, NON-EXPULSION AND NON-
REFOULEMENT 171 (1989).
29. U.N. Convention, supra note 27, art. 1.
30. INA § 201(a), 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(42).
31. OFFICE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HIGH COIIISSIONER FOR REFUGEES,
HANDBOOK ON PROCEDURES AND CRITERIA FOR DETERMINING REFUGEE STATUS
(1979) [hereinafter U.N. HANDBOOK].
32. See UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMISSION, PROTECTION DIVISION,
Preface to U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 1.
33. See U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 17.
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nizes an applicant's political opinion may be exhibited through
actions alone, even if that opinion is not overtly expressed.34
Lastly, if any evidentiary ambiguities remain regarding wheth-
er an applicant has been persecuted, they are to be interpreted
in a light most favorable to the asylum-seeker.35
A second important component of the U.N. Convention and
the U.N. Protocol is the concept of nonrefoulement."6 "This
principle prohibits a government from returning individuals to
a country where their lives or freedom would be in danger" 7
on account of one or more of the five enumerated character-
istics.38 If an individual shows a "clear probability of persecu-
tion," the withholding of deportation becomes mandatory.39 A
"clear probability of persecution"4" is such that it is more like-
ly than not that the alien will be persecuted upon return to his
or her country.41 Although these definitions and interpreta-
tions are instructive as to how U.S. asylum policy should oper-
ate, applying them often leads to ambiguities and inconsisten-
cies.
C. Administrative and Judicial Interpretations
Notwithstanding the United States' adherence to the inter-
national definition of "refugee," the historical, administrative,
and judicial treatment of granting of asylum to aliens on ac-
count of their opposition to their countries' population control
policies is replete with inconsistencies. In 1988, then-Attorney
General Edwin Meese set forth policy guidelines42 "designed
34. Id. at 20.
35. See id. at 47-49.
36. See Compton, supra note 12, at 916.
37. Id.
38. See id.
39. Id. (citing INS v. Stevic, 467 U.S. 407, 407 (1984)).
40. Stevic, 467 U.S. at 407.
41. See Compton, supra note 12, at 916 (citing Stevic, 467 U.S. at 429).
42. Section 1158(a) of the Refugee Act provides:
The Attorney General shall establish a procedure for an alien physically
present in the United States or at a land border or port of entry, irre-
spective of such alien's status, to apply for asylum, and the alien may be
granted asylum in the discretion of the Attorney General if the Attorney
General determines that such alien is a refugee within the meaning of
section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title.
8 U.S.C. § 1158(a) (1994). Section 1158(b) provides:
Asylum granted under subsection (a) of this section may be terminated if
the Attorney General, pursuant to such regulations as the Attorney Gen-
1997] 315
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to ensure that asylum could be granted to persons who demon-
strated a well-founded fear of persecution stemming from the
PRC's family planning policy."3 The Department of Justice
(DOJ) issued policy guidelines to the Immigration and Natural-
ization Service (INS) noting that because the PRC's govern-
ment views opposition to its forced sterilization policies as a
form of "political dissent," a finding of the required "'well-
founded fear of persecution under these circumstances is rea-
sonable."" The DOJ further concluded that this constituted
persecution on account of "political opinion" under the INA and
would therefore be grounds for granting asylum.45 Despite
Attorney General Meese's promulgation, the Board of Immigra-
tion Appeals (BIA) disregarded it in its 1989 decision, In re
Chang," by finding that these guidelines were directed to the
INS, not to immigration judges or to the BIA"
After the Chang decision, many voiced their opposition to
the PRC's policies, as well as their disagreement with the
Chang ruling. For example, Congress, in its Armstrong-
DeConcini Amendment (Amendment) to the Emergency Chi-
eral may prescribe, determines that the alien is no longer a refugee with-
in the meaning of section 1101(a)(42)(A) of this title owing to a change in
circumstances in the alien's country of nationality or, in the case of an
alien having no nationality, in the country in which the alien last habit-
ually resided.
Id. § 1158(b).
43. Shu-Hao Zhao v. Schiltgen, No. C 93-3660 CW, 1995 WL 165562 at *1
(N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1995) (citing In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 43 (BIA 1989)).
44. Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 862 (E.D. Va. 1994) (citing 135
CONG. REC. S8244 (daily ed. July 19, 1989)).
45. Id. at 862 n.3.
46. In re Chang signifies the beginning of the judicial controversy over grant-
ing asylum based on opposition to a country's family planning policies. In In re
Chang, the BIA found that where the PRC's policies could, in certain circumstanc-
es, be grounds for granting asylum, implementation of the "one couple, one child"
policy "in and of itself, even to the extent that involuntary sterilizations may
occur,' is not persecution on account of race, religion, nationality, membership in a
particular social group, or political opinion, within the meaning of INA
§ 101(a)(42)(A)." Zhao, 1995 WL 165562, at *1, (quoting In re Chang, 20 I. & N.
Dec. at 44).
47. See id. at *1 (citing In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec., at 43). Asylum cases in
the United States are first heard by an immigration judge, who makes the initial
determination regarding an alien's application for withholding of deportation and
asylum. See 8 C.F.R. § 208.2(b) (1996). The immigration judge's decision is then
appealable to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). See id. § 3.38(a). If a peti-
tioner disagrees with the finding of the BIA, he or she may seek review of the
BIA determination in the federal courts of appeals. See 8 U.S.C. § 1105a(a) (1994).
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nese Immigration Relief Act of 1989 (Relief Act)," took strides
to overrule Chang.49 Although the Act was passed by both the
House and the Senate, it was pocket-vetoed by President Bush,
despite his general agreement with it.5" In conformity with
the Amendment, President Bush gave direction to the Attorney
General to give "enhanced consideration" to aliens who fear
persecution in the form of forced abortion or sterilization upon
return to their country.5'
In January 1990, in response to the President's instruc-
tions, the Attorney General announced an interim rule, amend-
ing the existing rules regarding asylum and withholding of
deportation in relation to forced sterilization policies.52 The
1990 interim rule53 provided that:
1. Aliens who have a well-founded fear that they will be re-
quired... to be sterilized because of their country's family
planning policies may be granted asylum on the ground of
persecution on account of political opinion.
2. An applicant who establishes that the applicant (or the
applicant's spouse) has refused... to be sterilized in viola-
tion of a country's family planning policy, and who has a
well-founded fear that he or she will be required... to be
48. The Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989 provides in perti-
nent part:
With respect to the adjudication of all applications for asylum, withhold-
ing of deportation, or refugee status from nationals of China filed before,
on, or after the date of the enactment of this Act, careful consideration
shall be given to such an applicant who expresses a fear of persecution
upon return to China related to China's "one couple, one child" family
planning policy. If the applicant establishes that such applicant has re-
fused to abort or be sterilized, such applicant shall be considered to have
established a well-founded fear of persecution, if returned to China, on
the basis of political opinion consistent with paragraph (42)(A) of section
101(a) of the Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)).
Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of 1989, H.R. 2712, 101st Cong. § 3(a)
(1989).
49. See Zhao, 1995 WL 165562, at *1.
50. See id. President Bush withheld approval of the Bill, citing foreign rela-
tions concerns and a desire to maintain executive control over the situation. See
Memorandum of Disapproval for the Emergency Chinese Immigration Relief Act of
1989, 25 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1853 (Nov. 30, 1989) [hereinafter Memoran-
dum of Disapproval].
51. Memorandum of Disapproval, supra note 50, at 1853-54.
52. See Zhao, 1995 WL 165562, at *1-2.
53. Refugee Status, Withholding of Deportation, and Asylum; Burden of Proof,
55 Fed. Reg. 2803 (1990). This interim rule took effect on January 29, 1990. See
Zhao, 1995 WL 165562, at *2.
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sterilized or otherwise persecuted if the applicant were re-
turned to such country may be granted asylum.'
On April 11, 1990, President Bush issued Executive Order
12,711, which again required the Attorney General to "provide
for enhanced consideration under the immigration laws for
individuals from any country who express a fear of persecution
upon return to their country related to that country's policy of
forced abortion or coerced sterilization."5
In July 1990, the Attorney General promulgated the final
rule making considerable changes in the regulations pertaining
to asylum and withholding of deportation.56 This rule omitted
both the 1990 interim rule and "inexplicably removed any
reference to the issue of asylum for persecution on the basis of
opposition to family planning practices."57 Much confusion
regarding the status of asylum law in the United States en-
sued, and in January 1993, then-Attorney General William
Barr signed a final rule (1993 Rule), reiterating the 1990 inter-
im rule and overruling Chang." The 1993 Rule authorized
asylum on the basis of opposition to the PRC's family planning
policies.59 Three days before the anticipated publication of the
54. 55 Fed. Reg. 2803; see Guo Chun Di v. Carroll, 842 F. Supp. 858, 863
(E.D. Va. 1994) (discussing this rule).
55. Exec. Order No. 12,711, 55 Fed. Reg. 13,897 (1990).
56. See 55 Fed. Reg. at 30,674-88 (codified in scattered sections of 8 C.F.R.).
57. Zhao, 1995 WL 165562, at *2.
58. See id.
59. See id. The 1993 Rule provides as follows:
An applicant (and the applicant's spouse, if also an applicant) shall be
found to be a refugee on the basis of past persecution on account of
political opinion if the applicant establishes that, pursuant to the imple-
mentation by the country of the applicant's nationality or last habitual
residence of a family planning policy that involves or results in forced
abortion or coerced sterilization, the applicant has been forced to abort a
pregnancy or to undergo sterilization or has been persecuted for failure
or refusal to do so, and that the applicant is unable or unwilling to
return to, or to avail himself or herself of the protection of, that country
because of such persecution ....
An applicant (and the applicant's spouse, if also an applicant) shall
be found to be a refugee on the basis of a well-founded fear of persecu-
tion on account of political opinion if the applicant establishes a well-
founded fear that, pursuant to the implementation by the country of the
applicant's nationality or last habitual residence of a family planning
policy that involves or results in forced abortion or coerced sterilization,
the applicant will be forced to abort a pregnancy or to undergo steriliza-
tion or will be persecuted for failure or refusal to do so, and that the
318
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1993 Rule, President Clinton was inaugurated and, immediate-
ly thereafter, a directive was issued "prohibiting the publica-
tion of any new regulations not approved by an agency head
appointed by President Clinton."" The 1993 Rule was one of
the regulations that was withdrawn, and has not been resub-
mitted or published.6'
Finally, in December 1993, Attorney General Janet Reno,
after examining two asylum cases from the BIA, declined to
resolve any conflict between the 1989 Chang decision and
Executive Order 12,711.62 The Clinton Administration has not
taken any further action on this issue.3 Therefore, the July
1990 omission of any reference to asylum based on family
planning practices remains as the current state of the regula-
tions. The various regulations promulgated by the Attorney
General pursuant to the Refugee Act have further contributed
to the ambiguities inherent in the definition of "refugee."
III. ZHAO V. SCHILTGEN
A. Factual Background of Zhao
Petitioner Shu-Hao Zhao was a thirty-six year old citizen
of the People's Republic of China.' On April 16, 1993, peti-
tioner fled China and headed for the United States, where he
was arrested by the INS for failing to possess a valid immi-
grant visa.65 Mr. Zhao was placed in exclusion proceedings
pursuant to section 235 of the INA.66 Petitioner applied for
asylum and withholding of deportation6 1 pursuant to the INA,
arguing that based upon his well-founded fear of being perse-
cuted on account of his political opinion, he should not be de-
applicant is unable or unwilling to return to, or avail himself or herself
of the protection of, that country because of such fear.
Id. at *8 n.3 (citing Attorney Gen. Order No. 1659-93, § 208.13(2)(ii), JA 1652,
1664-65 (Jan. 15, 1993)); see also Xin-Chang Zhang v. Slattery, 55 F.3d 732, 740
(2d Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 1271 (1996).
60. Zhao, 1995 WL 165562, at *2.
61. See id.
62. See id. at *3.
63. See id.
64. See id.
65. See id.
66. See id.; 8 U.S.C. § 1225 (1994).
67. For an explication of the difference between asylum and withholding of
deportation, see supra note 8 and accompanying text.
1997] 319
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ported.68 At a hearing before an immigration judge,69 peti-
tioner provided information about his history and the details of
what prompted his flight to the United States.
Petitioner was married and had two daughters, in viola-
tion of the PRC's "one couple, one child" policy.7" His youngest
child was born physically disabled, and resided with relatives
in a city where the birth control policies were not strictly en-
forced.7 Petitioner resided in the Chungwang Township,
Linjuan County, of the Fujian Province of China.72 In 1992,
petitioner's wife became pregnant with their third child, and
shortly thereafter, received notice from the family planning
committee that she was to report to the hospital for an abor-
tion and a tubal ligation.7" In addition, they were notified that
they would be fined 5,000 yuan for excessive birth. 4
Unwilling to undergo a forced abortion and sterilization,
petitioner and his wife fled from their residence to the Fuzhou
province where they stayed with friends.75 While away from
his home and village, petitioner learned that the authorities
had confiscated his television and refrigerator, that his eldest
daughter had been expelled from school, and that his employ-
ment had been suspended.76
After learning that their youngest daughter would be re-
turning home for a visit, petitioner and his wife, who was then
seven months pregnant, secretly returned home to their vil-
lage.77 Shortly after their arrival home, family planning offi-
cials were notified of their return, and arrested petitioner's
wife. 78 The next day, February 21, 1993, petitioner's wife was
forced to have an abortion in her seventh month of pregnan-
cy. 7
9
When petitioner arrived at the hospital to visit his wife
68. See Shu-Hao Zhao v. Schiltgen, No. C 93-3660 CW, 1995 WL 165562, at
*3-7 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1995).
69. In re Zhao, No. A 72 969 069 (July 15, 1993).
70. Id.
71. Zhao, 1995 WL 165562, at *3.
72. See id.
73. See id.
74. See id.
75. See id.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See id.
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after her abortion, angry words ensued between him and a
government official.8" Petitioner pushed the official, who re-
portedly suffered a broken arm." Petitioner managed to es-
cape the hospital and once again fled to the Fuzhou prov-
ince.82 After learning that he was wanted for arrest for violat-
ing the family planning law and for assaulting a government
official, petitioner fled to the United States.'
B. Procedural History of Zhao
On July 15, 1993, the immigration judge, relying on the
BIA's decision in In re Chang," denied petitioner's application
for asylum.' The immigration judge stated that although she
found petitioner's testimony believable, she also recognized
that "'[t]here is no evidence in this record that [petitioner] has
any reason to fear punishment different than all of the rest of
the individuals in China if he is in fact forced to return
there.'8 6
Petitioner appealed the immigration judge's decision to the
BIA, and on September 22, 1993, the BIA dismissed his ap-
peal.87 The BIA disagreed with petitioner's contention that
President Bush's Executive Order 12,711 overruled Chang, and
concluded that the case was governed by regulations issued by
the Attorney General.' The BIA held that it would not over-
rule Chang by upholding petitioner's claim because the Attor-
ney General never gave it directions to apply different stan-
dards from those applied in Chang.89 Petitioner then appealed
the BIA's decision to the United States District Court for the
Northern District of California.
80. See id.
81. See id.
82. See id.
83. See fid.
84. In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 43 (BIA 1989); see supra note 47.
85. See Shu-Hao Zhao v. Schiltgen, No. C 93-3660 CW, 1995 WL 165562, at
*4 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1995).
86. Id. (quoting In re Zhao, A 72 969 069 (July 15, 1993), at 10) (alteration in
original).
87. See id.
88. See id.; see also supra notes 54-62 and accompanying text.
89. See Zhao, 1995 WL 165562, at *4.
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C. The District Court's Decision
The district court affirmed the BIA's decision denying
asylum to petitioner, and held that although Executive Order
12,711 criticizes Chang, it did not overrule it.9" In addition,
the district court found that until further legislative or execu-
tive action is taken, Chang would control.9
Mr. Zhao asserted that a person's views regarding his or
her country's population control policies are "political" within
the meaning of section 1101 of the INA. 2 Petitioner argued
that by choosing to have another child, he became a "political
enemy of the government, and thus must be granted asylum in
accordance with [the 1992 U.S. Supreme Court's decision in]
Elias-Zacarias."93 Although petitioner argued that by seeking
to have another child he and his wife were acting contrary to
the PRC's policy, and thus expressing their political opinion,
the district court found that Chang made clear that the "eligi-
bility for asylum cannot be established absent some evidence
that the government's motivation for applying its policy was
specifically because Petitioner has a political opinion the PRC
sought to influence."94 The district court further concluded
90. See id. at *5.
91. See id. at *6.
92. See id. Section 1101(a)(42)(A) specifies that an alien may be classified as a
refugee within the meaning of the INA if he or she is unable or unwilling to
return to the country of origin because of persecution or well-founded fear of per-
secution on account of race, nationality, membership in a particular social group,
or political opinion. See id.; see also supra notes 8-10 and accompanying text.
93. Zhao, 1995 WL 165562 at *6. In INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482
(1992), the U.S. Supreme Court put forth principles applicable to aliens seeking
asylum based on their political opinion. As the Zhao court noted:
First, the Court [in Elias-Zacarias] held in order to reverse a BIA finding
that an alien failed to establish a well-founded fear of persecution, the
record must compel the conclusion that the alien expressed a political
opinion, and it must compel the additional conclusion that the "persecu-
tor" would persecute the alien because of that political opinion. Further,
the Court held that the mere existence of a general political motive un-
derlying the persecutor's actions was insufficient to establish asylum since
the focus of the statute is the victim's political opinion, not the
persecutor's. Since motive is a critical factor in determining eligibility, a
petitioner must then provide evidence that the persecutor's motive was to
harm him specifically because of his political opinion. Thus, punishment
under a law of general applicability will not ordinarily constitute persecu-
tion on account of political opinion unless the punishment provided is far
in excess of that which is applied to the population as a whole.
Id. (citations omitted) (emphasis added).
94. Id. at *7 (citing In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38, 44 (BIA 1989)).
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that petitioner failed to provide it with any evidence indicating
that the PRC wished to enforce its family planning policy
against him for any reason other than maintaining population
control.5 Furthermore, the district court pointed out that
punishment based on general applicability of a law does not
establish that an individual is persecuted on account of his or
her political opinion, absent other evidence of persecution,
since under Elias-Zacarias, it is the victim's political opinion
which is determinative.95 In other words, the district court
asserted that if petitioner had contended that the PRC specifi-
cally sought out his family due to contrary political beliefs or
religious opinions, granting of asylum would have been war-
ranted.97 Because the one-couple, one-child policy by its na-
ture involves "general applicability," the district court found
that petitioner neither had been persecuted nor had a well-
founded fear of being persecuted on account of his political
opinion." In conclusion, the district court found that the
BIA's decision in In re Chang was controlling, and that Mr.
Zhao did not present evidence that he had a well-founded fear
of persecution based on his specific political beliefs. 9 There-
fore, the district court denied petitioner's writ of habeas cor-
pus. 100
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Petitioner's Claim Encompassed a Well-Recognized U.S.
Right that Was "Political"
According to the district court's reading of Elias-Zacarias,
in order to gain asylum an alien must prove that he or she
expressed a political opinion and that he or she would be per-
secuted on account of that opinion.' Furthermore, an indi-
vidual has the burden of proving that the persecutor's motive
was to harm him or her specifically because of that political
opinion,"' and not simply because of general political mo-
95. See id.
96. See id. at *7.
97. See id.
98. Id.
99. See id. at *8,
100. See id.
101. See id. at *6.
102. See id.
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tives.' By refusing to find that petitioner's opposition to the
PRC's population control policy constituted his political opin-
ion, the district court possessed an overly narrow view of what
is "political" for asylum purposes. Based on U.S. jurispruden-
tial notions of what constitutes "political," and on international
refugee standards which are the basis of U.S. asylum law,
petitioner's actions should have been deemed "political," and
asylum should have been granted accordingly.
1. United States' Notions of "Political Opinion"
Mr. Zhao violated the PRC's family planning policies not
once, but twice.'04 The law mandates that couples are legally
permitted to have only one child in order to maintain popula-
tion control. When petitioner's wife became pregnant with
their third child, in clear violation of the PRC's policy, they
fled their village and went into hiding, only to return to their
home upon the arrival of their youngest daughter.0 5 After
being apprehended by authorities for violating its family plan-
ning policy, Mr. Zhao's wife was forced to abort her seven
month fetus."6 After having an altercation with a govern-
ment official in the hospital,' 7 and after violating the PRC's
population control policy for the second time, Mr. Zhao fled to
the United States in anticipation of gaining political asy-
lum.10
8
Despite the great lengths Mr. Zhao and his wife went
through to defy the PRC's population control policy, the district
court found that petitioner's actions did not demonstrate his
"political opinion." Absent other evidence of persecution, pun-
ishment based on a law that applies to the population at large
does not constitute persecution on account of a political opin-
ion.
0 9
This premise instructs us to look at China's definition of
"political opinion" when determining whether or not to grant
103. See Moschella, supra note 13, at 481.
104. See Shu-Hao Zhao v. Schiltgen, No. C 93-3660 CW, 1995 WL 165562, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1995).
105. See id.
106. See id.
107. See supra text accompanying notes 80-81.
108. See Zhao, 1995 WL 165562, at *3-4.
109. Id. at *7 (citing INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992)); see su-
pra Part III.C.
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asylum to an alien in the United States. When a U.S. court
decides whether or not an individual should be granted politi-
cal asylum, it is only logical to apply U.S. notions of what is
considered persecution on account of political opinion. Merely
analyzing how the PRC defines political opinion, when ulti-
mately deciding whether or not an individual should be permit-
ted to remain in the United States, is contrary to the ideals of
U.S. asylum laws.
Based on China's actions since the implementation of its
policy in 1979, it is obvious that the PRC does not consider an
individual's active opposition to its population control policies a
form of political expression. If the PRC viewed active opposi-
tion to its policies as a demonstration of one's political opinion,
then surely forcing women to have abortions and mandating
compulsory sterilization of both men and women would be
deemed a form of political oppression. It is not considered a
form of political oppression in China, however, because inten-
tionally becoming pregnant in violation of the one-couple, one-
child policy, is not deemed an expression of an individual's po-
litical opinion. Therefore, it defies logic to preclude an individ-
ual, like Mr. Zhao, from gaining asylum in the United States
strictly because his country does not consider his actions to be
a form of political expression. After all, it is only reasonable to
assume that a petitioner, such as Mr. Zhao, would not have
fled his country to begin with, if China recognized its actions to
be a form of political oppression that was reprehensible.
Mr. Zhao's actions, which clearly were in opposition to his
country's population control policy, were "political""' based
on current U.S. notions of individual liberty and freedom. The
United States Supreme Court has found that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment contains a liberty in-
terest that extends to individual decision-making regarding
choices that involve the most intimate and personal mat-
ters."' The Supreme Court has consistently recognized the
right of individuals to make procreative decisions.12 The
110. "Political" is defined as "of or pertaining to exercise of rights and privileg-
es or the influence by which individuals of a state seek to determine or control its
public policy; having to do with organization or action of individuals ..
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1158 (6th ed. 1990).
111. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
112. See, e.g., Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (holding that mar-
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right to procreate, the right to be free from unwarranted gov-
ernmental intrusion, and more generally, the right to privacy,
are liberties that U.S. citizens now enjoy. Through a series of
Supreme Court cases and numerous political protests, U.S. citi-
zens have been arguing over such complex issues for decades.
Thus, it seems unreasonable not to deem opposition to a
country's coercive population control policy encompassing,
among other things, compulsory sterilization and forced abor-
tion, as a form of political opinion or expression.
Although aliens generally are not protected by provisions
of the U.S. Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, U.S. courts should use domestic no-
tions of political expression by analogy. By not extending our
domestic definition of "political opinion" to individuals seeking
asylum, such as petitioner, the United States is being inconsis-
tent and disingenuous. Through its inconsistencies, the United
States has not been true to the ideals of its asylum laws.
The Eastern District of Virginia, in its decision in Guo
Chun Di v. Carroll,"' has been true to U.S. asylum laws and
the domestic definition of "political opinion." In Guo Chun Di
the district court articulated that "there can be little doubt
that the phrase 'political opinion' encompasses an individual's
views regarding procreation.""4 The Guo Chun Di court de-
scribed the legal precedents defining the right of individuals to
make procreative decisions, and further stated that
"[ilnvoluntary sterilization, in particular, has been viewed as
an egregious infringement on the fundamental right to procre-
ate.""' The court emphasized that "[b]ecause the right to
make procreational decisions is a basic liberty right protected
under the Bill of Rights, it is, in that respect, analogous to
other fundamental rights that are well-recognized as legitimate
grounds for asylum, such as the freedom of religion and free-
ied couples have the right to use contraception); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S.
438 (1972) (holding that non-married individuals have a right to contraception);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (holding that women have the right to obtain
an abortion free from governmental intrusion in the first trimester); Carey v. Pop-
ulation Services InVl, 431 U.S. 678 (1977) (finding that the right to bear a child is
at the heart of a cluster of constitutionally protected rights).
113. 842 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Va. 1994).
114. Id. at 872.
115. Id. (citing Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942)); see Moriarty,
supra note 3, at 479.
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dom of speech.""6 In conclusion, the court stressed that "it is
beyond dispute that the expression of one's views regarding
issues related to the right to procreate is 'political.'""7 Thus,
the Guo Chun Di court held that petitioner Guo was eligible
for a discretionary grant of asylum on account of his opposition
to the PRC's population control policy."'
Similarly, Mr. Zhao's blatant opposition to the PRC's fami-
ly planning policy was plainly an expression of his political
opinion. The Zhao court should have followed the sensible
precedent set by the Eastern District of Virginia in Guo Chun
Di, and found Mr. Zhao eligible for a discretionary grant of
asylum.
2. International Standards
In addition to seeking guidance from U.S. notions of politi-
cal expression, the Zhao court should have relied on interna-
tional refugee standards to adequately support a finding that
Mr. Zhao was eligible for a discretionary grant of asylum. For
example, the U.N. Handbook. provides guidance for resolv-
ing the issue of what is considered political opinion under the
internationally accepted definition of "refugee". The Supreme
Court recognized this in INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca,2 ° indicat-
ing that because the Refugee Act was founded on international
refugee standards, the U.N. Handbook was persuasive in inter-
preting the Refugee Act.'2 ' The U.N. Handbook indicates that
the actions of a petitioner alone can constitute political opin-
ion, even if that opinion is not clearly expressed.'22 In other
words, a petitioner should not be required to express his or her
political opinion like a politician does before he or she is able
to qualify for asylum. This view is further supported by the
U.N. Handbook, as it demonstrates that if any ambiguities
remain with regard to proving persecution, they should be
interpreted in the light most favorable to the individual seek-
116. Guo Chun Di, 842 F. Supp. at 872 (footnotes omitted).
117. Id.
118. Id. at 874.
119. See supra note 31.
120. 480 U.S. 421 (1987).
121. Id. at 438-39 & n.22; see Moschella, supra note 13, at 479.
122. See Moschella, supra note 13, at 474.
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ing asylum." Therefore, interpretation of the U.N. Hand-
book provides further evidence and support for the conclusion
that Mr. Zhao's actions should have been deemed political
opinion, even though his request for asylum might not have
been eloquently stated.
Further examination of international standards reveals
that Mr. Zhao should have been granted asylum. For example,
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, article 16(1),
states that persons "have the right to marry and to found a
family."' Article 23(2) of the International Covenant on Civ-
il and Political Rights has a parallel provision." The United
Nations Human Rights Committee has interpreted these provi-
sions as follows: "[T]he right to found a family implies, in prin-
ciple, the possibility to procreate and live together. When State
parties adopt family planning policies, they should be compati-
ble with the provisions of the Covenant and should, in particu-
lar, not be discriminatory or compulsory.""
Undoubtedly, the PRC's one-couple, one-child policy is
contrary to this provision.'27 There is ample evidence indicat-
ing that the PRC's family planning policy is implemented by
forcing individuals to undergo compulsory sterilizations and
forced abortions.'28 Additionally, the PRC's policy is both ar-
bitrary and discriminatory, in that it is administered inconsis-
tently.2 9
Therefore, taking into consideration U.S. notions of politi-
123. See id.
124. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, GA Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d
Sess., pt. 1, at 74, U.N. Doc A/810 (1948); see also Moriarty, supra note 3, at 482-
83.
125. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19,
1966, art. 23, para. 2, S. EXEC. Doc. E, 95-2 at 30 (1978), 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 179.
126. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights: General Comments,
U.N. GAOR, Hum. Rts. Comm., general cmt. No. 19(39), para. 5, U.N. Doc.
CCPR/C/21/Rev.1iAdd.2 (1990).
127. See Moriarty, supra note 3, at 483.
128. See, e.g., Shu-Hao Zhao v. Schiltgen, No. C 93-3660 CW, 1995 WL 165562,
at *3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1995); Yang You Yi v. Maugans, 24 F.3d 500, 502 (3d
Cir. 1994) (where petitioner's wife was forced to undergo sterilization after she
gave birth to a second child); Chen Zhou Chai v. Carroll, 48 F.3d 1331, 1334 (4th
Cir. 1995) (petitioner's wife, who was five months pregnant with their third child,
was forced to have an abortion); Li Zhi Guan v. Carroll, No. 94-1759, 1995 WL
396914, at *1 (4th Cir. Jul. 7, 1995) (PRC officials, after realizing that petitioner's
wife could not withstand the sterilization procedure, sought to sterilize petitioner).
129. See Moriarty, supra note 3, at 483.
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cal opinion and international human rights and refugee law,
the Zhao court should have granted Mr. Zhao asylum. By not
recognizing petitioner's eligibility for asylum based on interna-
tional human rights law and U.S. notions of political opinion,
the Zhao court placed an unreasonable burden on Mr. Zhao,
and ultimately forced him to return to a country where he
would be sure to face persecution.
B. Petitioner Had a Well-Founded Fear of Being Persecuted
Although attempting to gain refugee status in the United
States first requires an individual to prove that he or she actu-
ally expressed a political opinion, this alone is not sufficient.
As the district court expressed in its reading of Elias-
Zacarias,"30 a petitioner must also prove that the state would
persecute him or her because of that political opinion."3' The
district court found that Mr. Zhao did not adequately prove
that he would be persecuted based on his political opinion
upon his return to the PRC."' More specifically, the district
court found that "Petitioner faced punishment after the forced
abortion, not because Petitioner's wife did not submit volun-
tarily to the procedure, but because of Petitioner's struggle
with family planning officials in the hospital. 3
Despite the fact that petitioner might have indeed faced
penalties for his struggle with an official upon his return to the
PRC, it cannot be disputed that he also had a well-founded
fear of being persecuted based upon his flagrant violation of
the PRC's population control policy. Any analysis by the court
that insinuates that Mr. Zhao was only in fear of being perse-
cuted for arguing with a governmental official, ignores the
fundamental truth and runs counter to the ideals of the Refu-
gee Act.
Furthermore, according to the U.N. Handbook, asylum-
seekers need not "identify the reasons" for the persecution they
fear "in detail."'34 Because an asylum applicant does not have
130. INS v. Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. 478, 482 (1992).
131. See Shu-Hao Zhao v. Schiltgen, No. C 93-3660 CW, 1995 WL 165562, at
*6 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1995).
132. See id. at *7.
133. Id.
134. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 17.
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to assert in detail his or her persecutor's motives,' petition-
er had less of a burden to prove than the district court indi-
cated in its decision. Moreover, simply because there exists one
form of persecution that is not recognized by the statute should
not preclude a finding that petitioner was also persecuted on
account of his political opinion. In other words, believing that
petitioner would be persecuted because of his scuffle with the
Chinese authorities does not mean that he would not also be
persecuted on account of his political opinion."16 It should be
sufficient for an asylum-seeker to prove that he or she would
be persecuted upon his or her return to the PRC, by showing
how and when other similarly situated individuals are perse-
cuted in China. The Zhao court simply closed its eyes to the
truth by inferring that there was not ample evidence that peti-
tioner was sure to be persecuted upon his return to the PRC
based on both his political actions and opinions. Extensive case
law and statistics exist that indicate how individuals, like
petitioner, are treated when they violate the PRC's population
control policies."1
7
For example, although the PRC's policies include such
measures as education, propaganda and economic incentives,
there is also evidence that its policies include "officially sanc-
tioned forced abortions, mandatory sterilizations, implantation
of IUDs, and 'coercive community pressures' to persuade preg-
nant women to terminate pregnancies.""8 In addition, cases
such as Shan Ming Wang v. Slattery,"9 and Li Zhi Guan v.
Carroll,4 ' provide specific evidence that individuals are
forced to have abortions in late months of pregnancy, that both
men and women are forced to undergo sterilization procedures,
are excessively fined for violation of the policy, and are as-
signed to dangerous and undesirable work in government-
owned factories." These two cases do not stand alone. They
are among many cases that demonstrate how men and women
135. See Elias-Zacarias, 502 U.S. at 483.
136. See infra text accompanying notes 142-45.
137. See infra notes 138-41.
138. Sharon K. Horn, Female Infanticide in China: The Human Rights Specter
and Thoughts Toward Another Vision, 23 COLUm. HUM. RTs. L. REV. 249, 266
(1992).
139. 877 F. Supp. 133 (S.D.N.Y. 1995).
140. No. 94-1759, 1995 WL 396914, at *1 (4th Cir. Jul. 7, 1995).
141. See Wang, 877 F. Supp. at 135; Guan, 1995 WL 396914, at *1.
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are forced and manipulated to undergo procedures to limit
their ability to procreate. Cases and reports provide further
validation that Mr. Zhao had great reason to fear persecution
upon return to the PRC.
Furthermore, the facts of Zhao indicate that this well-
founded fear of persecution was based on his and his wife's
opposition to the PRC's population control policies. The district
court erred in finding that petitioner did not adequately estab-
lish this requirement. First, petitioner and his wife were spe-
cifically pursued by officials prior to the forced abortion and
sterilization procedures." Second, petitioner was fired from
his place of employment, his eldest daughter was expelled from
school, their home was raided and their personal belongings
were confiscated. Clearly, these facts indicate that the PRC
intended to harm him and his wife specifically because of their
opposition to its population control policy. In addition, it is
clear that the PRC began persecuting petitioner well before he
had the incident with the government official. Even if a court
were to find that the PRC was partially motivated by Mr.
Zhao's confrontation with a government official, this should not
preclude a finding that he had a well-founded fear of being
persecuted upon return to the PRC due to his ardent opposi-
tion to the one-couple, one-child policy.' As the Second Cir-
cuit in Osorio v. INS made clear, "the phrase 'persecution on
account of the victim's political opinion,' does not mean perse-
cution solely on account of the victim's political opinion."'45
The district court in Zhao also found that petitioner did
not meet the specificity requirement to establish a well-found-
ed fear of persecution because he did not provide any evidence
that others who violate the PRC's family planning policy are
not pursued and persecuted similarly. 46 Although the district
142. See Shu-Hao Zhao v. Schiltgen, No. C 93-3660 CW, 1995 WL 165562, at
*3 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1995).
143. See id.
144. See Osorio v. INS, 18 F.3d 1017, 1028 (2d Cir. 1994).
145. See id. The Osorio court explained:
Nothing in Elias-Zacarias suggests . . . that where an applicant fears
perseuction for both political and religious beliefs, that refugee should be
denied eligibility for political asylum. Similarly, where an applicant fears
persecution for both his political and economic beliefs, nothing in Elias-
Zacarias precludes a finding that the applicant is eligible for political
asylum.
Id.
146. See Zhao, 1995 WL 165562, at *7. In its decision, the Zhao court conclud-
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court was not original in its interpretation of this requirement,
it is unreasonable to find that an individual does not have a
well-founded fear of being physically harmed and persecuted
because others are similarly punished. As one author observed:
[Florced sterilization and [abortion are] invasive procedures
that would constitute human rights abuses when performed
without a woman's [or man's] consent; and a general policy of
imposing such measures ought to be deemed persecution ....
Deprivations of fundamental human rights are not to be ex-
cused, simply because the government oppresses all equal-
ly. 1
47
Moreover, the U.N. Handbook recognizes that an alien's fear
may reasonably be inspired by the persecution of similarly
situated persons and that persecution of members of an alien's
social group can indicate that the alien himself or herself will
suffer in the future.
14
The district court erroneously heightened the evidentiary
threshold an asylum applicant must meet by finding that Mr.
Zhao did not establish a well-founded fear of persecution based
on his political opinion. Petitioner had a "well-founded" fear
that he would be specifically persecuted based upon the voicing
of his political opinion. Mr. Zhao's deliberate circumvention of
the PRC's policy represented a political threat to the
government's authority. It was this political threat, along with
petitioner's defiance, that drove the PRC to persecute Mr.
Zhao. Any analysis which reaches a contrary conclusion is
intellectually dishonest. Even if the district court believed that
petitioner did not have a "well-founded" fear of persecution
ed that "Petitioner [did] not assert, nor [did] he provide any evidence, that others
who fled from family planning officials are not pursued and face no consequences."
Id. Therefore, the court ultimately inferred that because others are persecuted
similarly, Mr. Zhao did not have a well-founded fear of being persecuted. See id at
*8. This argument is also advanced by the Zhao court to demonstrate that perse-
cution of an individual, based on general application of a law, does not indicate
that he or she is persecuted on account of his or her political opinion. See supra
notes 94-99 and accompanying text.
147. Rebecca 0. Bresnick, Reproductive Ability as a Sixth Ground of Persecution
Under the Domestic and International Definitions of Refugee, 21 SYRACUSE J. INT'L
L. & CoM. 121, 136 (1995) (quoting T. Alexander Aleinikoff, The Meaning of "Per-
secution" in United States Asylum Law, 3 INTL J. REFUGEE L. 5, 23 (1991)) (em-
phasis added).
148. U.N. HANDBOOK, supra note 31, at 19.
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essentially unique or proportionally different than others in his
situation, this standard employed by the district court and
other courts alike, is both illogical and inconsistent with the
U.S. ideal of granting resettlement opportunities to those indi-
viduals fleeing persecution in other parts of the world.'4 9 Fur-
thermore, this decision forced Mr. Zhao, and will ultimately,
force other men and women who seek refugee status in the
United States based on their opposition to population control
policies, to return to an oppressive country that is protected by
the fact that it persecutes all its citizens equally.
V. THE PossILrrY OF A SIXTH PRONG TO U.S. ASYLUM LAWS
United States asylum laws, and more specifically, the
standard that defines persecution based upon political opinion,
is replete with inconsistencies. 5 ' One solution to ridding our-
selves of such disparities, is establishing a sixth category of
persecution under the statutory definition of "refugee". This
category would require the United States to grant refugee
status to an individual seeking asylum based upon a well-
founded fear of compulsory sterilization, as well as fear of
other forms of punishment based on reproductive ability.
For example, in Guo Chun Di v. Carroll,5' the District
149. This analysis is cognizant of the fact that our limited national resources
and current political trends preclude the United States from admitting an unlimit-
ed number of aliens. As Doris Meissner points out:
[Rlefugee resettlement tends to stimulate increases in a refugee flow.
While it meets the needs of particular refugees, [U.S.] experience has
been that the humanitarian response of resettlement, an attempt at solu-
tions, also creates the problem of generating more people in need. Over
time a refugee flow loses much of its refugee character and becomes a
migration stream. By this point, many of those on the move are seeking
admission to the United States to join family members and find opportu-
nity-the classic profile of an immigration rather than a refugee group.
To continue to admit such persons and call them refugees is improp-
er.... This brings into play a degree of public cynicism and hostility
that makes it difficult to draw from our national reservoir of humanitari-
anism and good will.
Meissner, supra note 14, at 59.
Confronting and dealing with this anti-immigration sentiment, however,
must be done in accordance with the statutory guidelines and the humanitarian
ideals it sought to address. Furthermore, due to inconsistent and arbitrary judicial
decisions, if immigration laws are to be further restricted, these restrictions should
come from Congress and not from the courts.
150. See supra text accompanying notes 42-63.
151. 842 F. Supp. 858 (E.D. Va. 1994).
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Court of Virginia, on appeal from a BIA decision denying peti-
tioner Guo Chun Di asylum, found that people "who have a
well-founded fear that they will be arrested and involuntarily
sterilized because they oppose and refuse to obey their
country's coercive population control policies may be granted
asylum on the ground of 'persecution... on account of...
political opinion. ""' 2 Petitioner Guo, in his deportation hear-
ing, testified that he and his wife were forced to flee the PRC
because they refused to stop having children, in clear opposi-
tion to China's policies, and consequently, they feared that
they would be forcibly sterilized.'53 The district court found
that Guo's refusal to comply with the PRC's policies and his
subsequent flight to the United States, constituted political
opinion."
Although the district court of Virginia was correct in find-
ing that Guo's actions constituted an expression of his political
opinion as statutorily defined, it could have also concluded that
Guo, and others similarly situated, were persecuted on account
of their reproductive ability.'55 The district court reasoned
that the right to procreate was a basic liberty right constitu-
tionally protected.' In comparing the right to procreate with
other fundamental constitutional rights such as freedom of
speech and freedom of religion, the district court "support[ed]
the recognition of persecution on account of reproductive abili-
ty as a new ground for refugee status."'57
Although asylum claims, such as those of petitioners Zhao
and Guo, may justly be categorized as persecution on account
of political opinion,'58 judicial bodies and executive agencies
have been inconsistent in such a finding.'59 Perhaps this is
an indication that a new category of persecution should be
added to the definition of "refugee".
The right to procreate, and more generally, reproductive
freedom, deserves as much protection from the United States
as that given to the five categories of persecution already rec-
152. Id. at 861.
153. See id. at 861-62.
154. See id. at 874.
155. See Bresnick, supra note 147, at 142.
156. See id.
157. Id.
158. See supra text accompanying notes 101-48.
159. See supra text accompanying notes 42-63.
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ognized under the INA: race, religion, nationality, membership
in a particular social group and political opinion. The United
States zealously protects these five categories because it deems
them fundamental rights which are entitled to the highest
degree of protection. Because the United States regards such
liberties as fundamental, it has been willing to extend such
rights abroad. In other words, although aliens are not privi-
leged with the rights afforded U.S. citizens, the United States,
through its current asylum laws, extends aliens such liberties
because it finds them to be so important that they are worthy
of the highest protection. Race, religion, nationality, member-
ship in a particular social group, and political opinion are so
worthy of protection in the United States that the United
States is willing to grant aliens asylum if they fear persecution
in their home country on account of any of these characteris-
tics. Likewise, reproductive freedom, and decisions relating to
procreation, have long been recognized as deserving constitu-
tional protection in the United States.6 ° They are afforded
constitutional protection because they involve "the most inti-
mate and personal choices a person may make in a life-
time .. .. "" Reproductive freedom, like the five statutorily
enumerated characteristics, "is fundamental to one's identity
and is similarly a basis upon which a person may not be sin-
gled out for differential treatment, at least in the United
States."62
Therefore, because the right to procreate is vigorously
protected in this country, as are race and political and reli-
gious freedom, a sixth category should be added to the defini-
tion of "refugee" under U.S. asylum laws. This category would
grant asylum to those who fear that their country will either
force them to reproduce or deprive them of such an opportuni-
ty. Such an amendment to U.S. law is a logical and just step,
"consistent with both the evolution of the definition and the
United States' historic concern for refugees."6 '
160. See supra notes 110-12 and accompanying text.
161. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
162. Bresnick, supra note 147, at 143-44.
163. Mattie L. Stevens, Note, Recognizing Gender-Specific Persecution: A Propos-
al to Add Gender as a Sixth Refugee Category, 3 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POLay 179,
179 (1993).
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VI. CONCLUSION
In Zhao v. Schiltgen, the United States District Court for
the Northern District of California erred in finding that Mr.
Zhao did not meet his burden for seeking asylum as a refugee
in the United States." In using the BIA's decision in In re
Chang65 as binding precedent, the Zhao court found that Mr.
Zhao's actions did not constitute "political opinion," and that
petitioner did not establish a "well-founded" fear that he would
be persecuted on account of political beliefs that were dissimi-
lar to other individuals in his position.'66 The district court,
however, erroneously applied inconsistent and unreasonable
judicial interpretations of United States asylum law to the
facts of Zhao's case. In addition, the Zhao court wrongly adopt-
ed an overly narrow definition of persecution and political
opinion. By adopting such a strict standard, the court aban-
doned the humanitarian ideals behind U.S. asylum law and
international refugee standards. The district court should have
found that acting in direct opposition to the PRC's one-couple,
one-child policy constituted political opinion as a matter of law.
Furthermore, the district court should have realized that Mr.
Zhao's fear of persecution based upon these beliefs was sub-
stantial, real, well-founded, and on account of his political
opinion, despite the fact that other individual men and women
in petitioner's situation are treated similarly. In essence, the
district court neglected to embrace the real purpose behind
U.S. asylum laws, which is
not to exclude people, but to make it possible for the United
States to protect those people who need protection the most:
individuals who have a well-founded fear that they will suffer
persecution."
Shu-Hau Zhao was one of these people who needed protection.
The Zhao court should have had the courage to grant Mr. Zhao
asylum, and to add to the meaning of life, rather than cheapen
it.
Finally, the difficulties inherent in applying our current
164. See Shu-Hao Zhao v. Schiltgen, No. C 93-3660 CW, 1995 WL 165562, at
*8 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 1995).
165. In re Chang, 20 I. & N. Dec. 38 (BIA 1989).
166. Zhao, 1995 WL 165562, at *4, *8.
167. Dietrich, supra note 21, at 71.
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definition of "refugee" to those fleeing persecution on account
of their opposition to their country's population control policies,
is a strong indication that Congress should explicitly recognize
such persecution as a sixth category under the Refugee Act.
United States jurisprudential notions of liberty and the ideals
behind our asylum laws demand nothing less.
Allison D. Sealove
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